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Global climate change — perhaps even more than other environmental problems — can be
addressed successfully only with a solid understanding of its economic dimensions.  This paper, prepared
as an introduction to the economics section of a forthcoming book from the Pew Center on Global Climate
Change, provides a primer for non-economists on how economic analysis can be brought to bear on three
broad questions:  what will be the benefits of global climate policies; what will be their costs; and how can
this information about alternative policies be assimilated in ways that are ultimately most useful for decision
makers?  Because of the magnitude of the anticipated benefits and costs of addressing the threat of global
climate change, its great time horizons, massive uncertainties, and physical and economic irreversibilities,
public policy in this area presents significant challenges to economic research.  Nevertheless, a firm
foundation is provided by the existing literature from nearly three decades of related theoretical and
empirical economic analysis.*Albert  Pratt  Professor  of  Business  and  Government,  and Faculty Chair, Environment and Natural Resources Program,
John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and University Fellow, Resources for the Future.  Helpful
comments  by Larry Goulder, Ev Ehrlich, and Michael Scott on a previous version of this chapter are gratefully
acknowledged, but all remaining errors are my own.
1Looked at somewhat differently, but still well within the framework of conventional economics, the problem is that the
atmosphere is treated as “common property,” and hence a freely-available receptacle for waste products.
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY:
A PRIMER
Robert N. Stavins*
For those who have not thought about the economic dimensions of environmental problems, a
detailed examination of the economics of global climate change policy might well seem pointless.  Surely
— the thinking might go — the performance of the economy is largely independent of the quality of the
environment; policy choices regarding environmental quality should be made without attention to economic
considerations; and economics cannot shed much light on ways to solve environmental problems.  Quite
to the contrary, of course, there are numerous bi-directional linkages between economic performance and
environmental quality; economic considerations can help inform policy decisions regarding environmental
protection; and economics provides powerful analytical methods for investigating environmental problems,
and hence can provide valuable insights about those problems’ potential solutions. The reasons for all of
this are essentially two-fold:  first, the causes of environmental degradation, at least in market economies,
are fundamentally economic in nature; and second, the consequences of environmental problems have
important economic dimensions.
Global climate change, perhaps even more than other environmental problems, can be addressed
successfully only with a solid understanding of its economic dimensions.  First, the fundamental cause of
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, almost by definition, is economic:  excessive emissions are
an example of an externality, a well-understood category of market failure, where markets left to their own
devices tend not to produce social efficiency.1  Second, economic analysis is clearly necessary to estimate
the costs that will be incurred when and if nations take actions to reduce the risk of global climate change.
Third, because of the large costs that will be involved in any serious climate change strategy, there is
considerable interest in economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments that can reduce the costs
of addressing the problem.  And fourth, turning to the other side of the ledger, the biophysical consequences
of global climate change can be evaluated with economic methods in order to identify the benefits or
avoided damages of global climate policy action.
This part of the book consists of six chapters, five of which examine specific aspects of the
economics of global climate policy. This introductory chapter develops the analytical framework within2A generic, but more detailed treatment of the basic analytical framework can be found in:  U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (1998).
3For a more extensive treatment of some of these issues, see:  Kolstad and Toman (2000).
4Although  the  pace  of  economic  research  on  global  climate  change  has  accelerated  greatly  in  the  past  decade,  the  earliest
work appeared more than 25 years ago.  See, for example:  Nordhaus (1977, 1982).
5For  a  summary of myths that non-economists seem to have regarding economics, and a set of responses thereto, see:
Fullerton and Stavins (1998).
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which economic analyses of policies intended to address the threat of global climate change can be carried
out.2  Along the way, analytical issues particularly germane to climate policy analysis are highlighted,3 and
in a concluding section, the relationships between these issues and the subsequent chapters are described.
Three broad economic questions are raised by the challenge of addressing the threat of global
climate change:4  what will be the benefits of reducing the risk of global climate change; what will be the
respective costs; and how can this information about the benefits and costs of alternative policy regimes
be assimilated in ways that are useful to decision makers?
1.1  The Benefits of Global Climate Change Policy
Economics is fundamentally anthropocentric; if an environmental change matters to any person —
now or in the future — then it should, in principle, show up in an economic assessment.  And environmental
changes do matter to people in a wide variety of ways.  The economic concept of environmental benefits
is considerably broader than most non-economists seem to think.5  From an economic perspective, the
environment can be viewed as a form of natural asset that provides service flows used by people in the
production of goods and services, such as agricultural output, human health, recreation, and more
amorphous goods such as quality of life.  This is analogous to the manner in which real physical capital
assets (for example, factories and equipment) provide service flows used in manufacturing.  As with real
physical capital, a deterioration in the natural environment (as a productive asset) reduces the flow of
services the environment is capable of providing.
Note that ecological benefits are very much part of the picture.  Here, it is important to distinguish
between ecosystem functions (for example, photosynthesis) and the environmental services produced by
ecosystems that are valued by humans (Freeman 1997).  The range of these services is great, including
obvious environmental products such as food and fiber, and services such as flood protection, but also
including the quality of recreational experiences, the aesthetics of the landscape, and such desires (for
whatever reasons) as the protection of marine mammals.  Existence value reflects human recognition of the
intrinsic value of an ecosystem.  The economic benefits of global climate change policies range from direct
and specific impacts, such as those on agricultural yields and prices, to less direct and more general effects
on biodiversity.6Reference  is  typically  made  to  willingness-to-pay  for  environmental improvement or  willingness-to-accept
compensation for environmental degradation.
7For a comprehensive treatment of the theory and methods of environmental benefit estimation, see:  Freeman (1993).
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Protecting the environment usually involves active employment of capital, labor, and other scarce
resources.  Using these resources to protect the environment means that they are not available to be used
for other purposes.  The economic concept of the “value” of environmental goods and services is couched
in terms of society's willingness to make trade-offs between competing uses of limited resources, and in
terms of aggregating over individuals' willingness to make these trade-offs.6  Economists' tools of valuation
were originally developed in a more limited context, one in which policy changes mostly cause changes in
individuals’ incomes and/or prices faced in the market.  Over the last thirty years, however, these ideas
have been extended to accommodate changes in the qualities of goods, to public goods that are shared by
individuals, and to other non-market services such as environmental quality and human health.7
The economist’s task of estimating the benefits or loss of benefits resulting from a policy intervention
is easiest when the benefits and costs are revealed explicitly through prices in established markets.  When
it comes to measuring enviornmental impacts, however, valuing benefits is more difficult, and requires
indirect methods.  With markets, consumers’ decisions about how much of a good to purchase at different
prices reveal useful information regarding the surplus consumers gain.  With non-market environmental
goods, it is necessary to infer this willingness to trade off other goods or monetary amounts for additional
quantities of environmental services using other techniques.  Environmental economists have developed a
repertoire of techniques that fall broadly into two categories:  indirect measurement and direct questioning.
Both sets of valuation methods are relevant for assessing the anticipated benefits of global climate change
policies.
Economists prefer to measure trade-offs by observing the actual decisions of consumers in real
markets,  using so-called  revealed  preference  methods.  Sometimes the researcher can observe
relationships that exist between the non-marketed (environmental) good and a good that has a market price.
Thus, individuals' decisions to avert or mitigate the consequences of environmental deterioration can shed
light on how people value other types of changes in environmental quality (averting behavior estimates).
In other cases, individuals reveal their preferences for environmental goods in the housing market (hedonic
property value methods), or for avoiding related health risks in labor markets (hedonic wage methods).
In still other cases, individuals reveal their demand for recreational amenities through their decisions to travel
to specific locations (Hotelling-Clawson-Knetsch and related methods).  These various estimation
techniques are well established for measuring the conceptual trade-offs that are the basis of environmental
valuation.  However, they are applicable only in limited cases.
In many other situations, it is simply not possible to observe behavior that reveals people’s
valuations of changes in environmental goods and services.  This is particularly true when the value is a
passive or non-use value.  For example, an individual may value a change in an environmental good
because she wants to preserve the option of consuming it in the future (option value) or because she
desires to preserve the good for her heirs (bequest value).  Still other people may envision no current or8In  assessing  these  economic  damages,  economists  recognize  that  humans  typically  adapt  to  risk  —  to  some degree —
in order to lower their anticipated losses.
9A review of the likely economic damages of global climate change is provided by:  Pearce et.al. (1996).
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future use by themselves or their heirs, but still wish to protect the good because they believe it should be
protected or because they derive satisfaction from simply knowing it exists (existence value).  With no
standard market trade-offs to observe, economists must resort to surveys in which they construct
hypothetical markets, employing stated preference, as opposed to revealed preference methods.  In the
best known stated preference method, commonly known as contingent valuation, survey respondents
are presented with scenarios that require them to trade-off, hypothetically, something for a change in the
environmental good or service in question.
Although great uncertainty exists regarding the magnitude (and — in some cases — even the
direction) of regional climate impacts, global climate change is anticipated to have a variety of impacts
generally that will affect human welfare, including:  changes in resource productivity (including, in some
cases, lower agricultural yields, and scarcer water resources); damages to human-built environments
(including coastal flooding due to sea level rise); human-health impacts (such as increased incidence of
tropical diseases in more temperate climates); and damages to various ecosystems.8  The uncertainties
surrounding these various physical impacts are very great, and those uncertainties are compounded by
imprecise estimates of respective economic consequences. 
Whereas impacts on marketed goods and services (such as agricultural output) can be estimated
with some reasonable degree of precision, monetary estimates for non-marketed goods are notoriously
imprecise.  Furthermore, existing economic estimates in both categories come from industrialized nations,
particularly the United States.  Much less is known about anticipated economic damages in developing
countries, which is especially troubling because they are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of global
climate change.9
1.2  The Costs of Global Climate Change Policy
The task of estimating the costs of global climate change policies may seem straightforward
compared with the conceptual problems and empirical difficulties associated with estimating the benefits
of such policies.  In a relative sense, this is true.  But as one moves towards developing more precise and
reliable cost estimates, significant conceptual and empirical issues arise.  More attention has been given by
economists to analyzing the costs than the benefits of global climate policy action (largely because of
existing uncertainties regarding regional biophysical impacts of climate change).  Hence, my treatment of
the cost side of the ledger is proportionately more extensive.
The economist's notion of cost, or more precisely, opportunity cost, is linked with — but distinct
from — everyday usage of the word.  Opportunity cost is an indication of what must be sacrificed in order
to obtain something.  In the environmental context, it is a measure of the value of whatever must be
sacrificed to prevent or reduce the chances of an environmental impact.  These costs typically do not10Costs  and  benefits  are  thus  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.  Environmental benefits are created by taking some
environmental  policy  action,  while  other benefits are thereby foregone.  Hence, the cost of an environmental-protection
measure  may  be  defined  as  the  gross  decrease  in  benefits  (consumer  and  producer  surpluses)  associated  with the
measure and with any price and/or income changes that may result (Cropper and Oates 1992).
11One  example  in  the  United  States  is  the  (Federal) regulation of contaminants in drinking water, the cost of which is
borne primarily by municipal governments.
12The  notion  that  environmental  regulation  can  foster  economic  growth  is  a  controversial  one  among  economists.  For
a debate on this proposition, see:  Porter and van der Linde (1995); and Palmer, Oates, and Portney (1995).  It is also
important  to  recognize  that  good  economic  analysis  can  be  used  (and  has  been  used)  to  identify  circumstances where
policies  involve real “negative opportunity costs,” such as policies that increase energy efficiency by reducing
distortionary energy subsidies.  In these cases, economic analysis can identify true “win-win” policy options.
13For example, if a firm chooses to close a plant because of a new regulation (rather than installing expensive control
equipment), this would be counted as zero cost in narrow compliance-cost estimates, but it is obviously a real cost.
14At  the  heart  of  the  notion  of  the  general  equilibrium  costs  of  climate change policies (and the general equilibrium
damages  of  climate  change) is the degree to which consumers and producers can substitute new goods and services
for  what  they  buy  and  sell  when  relative  prices  change.  For an analysis of the importance of such substitution in the
assessment of climate change policies, see:  Jorgenson, Goettle, Wilcoxen, and Ho (2000).
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coincide with monetary outlays, the accountant's measure of costs.  This may be because out-of-pocket
costs fail to capture all of the explicit and implicit costs that are incurred, or it may be because the prices
of the resources required to produce environmental quality may themselves provide inaccurate indications
of the opportunity costs of those resources.  Hence, the costs of global climate policies are the forgone
social benefits due to employing scarce resources for global climate policy purposes, instead of putting
these resources to their next best use.10
A taxonomy of environmental costs can be developed, beginning with the most obvious and moving
towards the least direct (Jaffe, Peterson, Portney, and Stavins 1995).  First, many policy makers and much
of the general public would identify the on-budget costs to government of administering (monitoring and
enforcing) environmental laws and regulations as the cost of environmental regulation.  This meets the
economist’s notion of (opportunity) cost, since administering environmental rules involves the employment
of resources (labor and capital) that could otherwise be used elsewhere.  But economic analysts would also
include as costs the capital and operating expenditures associated with regulatory compliance.  Indeed,
these typically represent a substantial portion of the overall costs of regulation, although a considerable
share of compliance costs for some regulations fall on governments rather than private firms.11  Additional
direct costs include legal and other transaction costs, the effects of refocused management attention, and
the possibility of disrupted production.
Next, there are what have sometimes been called “negative costs” of environmental regulation,
including  the  beneficial  productivity impacts  of  a  cleaner  environment  and the potential
innovation-stimulating effects of regulation.12 General equilibrium or multi-market effects associated
with discouraged investment13 and retarded innovation constitute another important layer of costs, as
do the transition costs of real-world economies responding over time to regulatory changes.1415This is measured by net benefits:  the difference between benefits and costs.
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Although the task of estimating the costs of environmental protection efforts might be somewhat
more straightforward than that of estimating environmental protection benefits, costs seldom can be
estimated with great precision, and producing high-quality cost estimates requires careful analysis.
Conceptually, there are four steps required to appraise empirically the cost of an environmental-protection
measure.  First, it is necessary to identify the specific policy instrument that is associated with the measure.
For example, is a conventional instrument, such as a technology standard, or a market-based instrument,
such as an emission charge, to be employed?  This can be important because the same target, such as a
given reduction in carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, may be achieved at very different total costs with
different policy instruments.  The second conceptual step is identifying the specific actions that sources will
take to comply with the statute or regulation, as implemented with the given policy instrument.  Some of
these actions may involve the adoption of a new piece of equipment, but others may involve a change in
process. Third, it is necessary to identify the true cost of each action, which requires more than assessing
required monetary outlays.  Fourth, it is often necessary to aggregate these costs across society and over
the relevant time frame. 
In the case of climate change, the cost of taking action includes:  direct outlays for control (for
example, the incremental cost of employing natural gas rather than more carbon-intensive coal for energy
generation);  partial  equilibrium  costs  to  both  producers  and  consumers  (for  example,  accelerated
depreciation of fixed capital); and general equilibrium costs that arise in related markets as prices adjust
(Hourcade et.al. 1996).  In this last regard, it is important to keep in mind that the ultimate consequences
of a given environmental policy initiative depend on interactions between the new policy and existing
regulations or tax policies.  In particular, additional costs can arise from interactions between climate
policies and pre-existing distortions in the economy, such as those due to taxes on labor (Goulder 1995).
The baselines utilized for climate policy cost analyses (and, for that matter, for benefit analyses) are
very important.  Indeed, a striking finding from a wide range of integrated assessment models (which layer
economic models upon underlying scientific models of climate change relationships) is that differences in
welfare impacts15 across plausible baseline assumptions are greater than the welfare impacts attributable
to climate policy itself (Goulder 2000).  These baselines are built upon various assumed time paths of future
economic growth, encompassing overall rates of growth plus relevant sectoral changes. A particularly
important aspect of alternative baselines is the assumed rate and direction of technological change.
The cost of achieving any given global climate target depends critically upon the “physical scope”
of policy action.  Does the policy being analyzed affect only  emissions, for example, of CO2 by
encouraging fuel switching?  Or does the policy also provide mechanisms for:  increased biological uptake
of carbon through carbon sequestration, presumably through changes in land use (Sedjo, Sampson, and
Wisniewski 1997; Stavins 1999); carbon management, that is, removal and storage of CO2 in the deep
ocean or depleted oil and gas reservoirs (Parson and Keith 1998); and/or geoengineering, such as various
means of increasing the earth’s reflectivity (National Academy of Sciences 1992)?  More broadly still, do16These  are  policies  that  reduce  the  damages  of  climate  change, but do not reduce the incidence of climate change.
Examples include sea walls to protect coastal areas from sea level rise, and improved pricing structures for water supplies
that would increase the responsiveness of demand to changes in water scarcity.
17For  a  comprehensive  review  of  worldwide  experiences  with  market-based  instruments  for  environmental  protection,  see:
Stavins (2000).
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the cost estimates allow for adaptation policies,16 which in many cases may be less costly than “equivalent”
measures that work through emissions reduction, sequestration, management, or geoengineering (Pielke
1998; Kane and Shogren 2000)?  Finally, does the policy being assessed focus exclusively on CO2 or are
a larger set of greenhouse gases being targeted?  This is a crucial question, since broader targets enhance
flexibility, and, in some cases, can reduce costs of achieving a given climate goal substantially (Hansen et.al.
2000).
Just as the allowed physical scope of policy response will affect the costs of achieving any given
climate target, the policy instrument chosen to affect change will have profound impacts on costs, both in
the short term and the long term.  On the domestic front, the portfolio of potential policy instruments
includes conventional technology and uniform performance standards (so-called command-and-control
approaches), as well as the newer breed of economic-incentive or market-based policy instruments, such
as taxes, tradeable permit systems, and various information policies (Stavins 1997).17  At the
international level, the set of instruments that have been subjected to analysis include international taxes,
harmonized domestic taxes, international tradeable permits, joint implementation, and the Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol (Fisher, et.al. 1996).  These two sets of climate policy
instruments — domestic and international — should not be thought of as functioning independently of one
another.  Indeed, the relative cost-effectiveness of what may be one of the most promising mechanisms,
the international tradeable permit system recognized by Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, will depend
greatly upon the particular set of domestic policy instruments adopted by participating nations (Hahn and
Stavins 1999).
The outcome of any cost comparison among greenhouse policy instruments also depends upon the
sophistication of the underlying analytical models.  With many environmental problems, relatively simple
analytical models can be employed for comparing policy instruments, since it is reasonable to utilize static
(short-term) cost-effectiveness as a criterion for comparison.  But the long-term nature of global climate
change and related policies means that it is important to employ a dynamic (long-term) cost-effectiveness
criterion for comparisons.  In this context, the intertemporal flexibility provided by some policy instruments,
such as banking and borrowing in a tradeable permit system, can turn out to be very significant (Manne and
Richels 1997).
More importantly, the very long time horizons typically employed in global climate policy analysis
mean that it is essential to allow for the effects of alternative policy instruments on the rate and direction of
relevant (cost-reducing) technological change (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 1999, 2000).  Three stages of
technological change (Schumpeter 1939) can be analyzed:  invention, the development of a new product
or process (Popp 1999); innovation or commercialization, the bringing to market of a new product or18In  the  give-and-take  of  policy  debates,  abatement  costs  of  proposed  regulations  have  sometimes  been  over-estimated
(Harrington,  Morgenstern,  and Nelson 2000; Hammitt 2000).  This may partly be due to the adversarial nature of the
policy process, but it is also a natural consequence of employing short-term cost analyses that do not take into account
potential,  future  cost  savings  due  to  technological change, some of which may be endogenous to the regulatory regime.
19As  mentioned  earlier,  climate  policy  instruments  can impose additional costs through their interaction with with pre-
existing distortionary taxes.  This raises another issue for cost comparisons since some policy instruments, such as taxes
and  auctioned  permits,  generate revenues, which can be used by governments to reduce pre-existing taxes, thereby
reducing what the overall costs of the policy would otherwise be (Goulder 1995).
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process (Newell, Jaffe, and Stavins 1999); and diffusion, the gradual adoption of new products and
processes by firms and individuals (Hassett and Metcalf 1995; Jaffe and Stavins 1995).18  Most large-scale
analyses of global climate policy have not allowed for endogenous technological improvements, but this is
beginning to change (Goulder and Schneider 1999; Nordhaus 1999; Goulder and Mathai 2000).19
Since the compliance costs associated with most climate policies are initially incurred by private
firms, it is important to analyze correctly the behavioral response of such firms to various policy regimes.
Most economic analyses treat firms as atomistic, profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing units.  This is
satisfactory for many purposes, but it can lead to distorted estimates of the costs brought about by some
policies.  For example, one potentially important cause of the mixed performance of implemented market-
based instruments is that many firms are simply not well equipped internally to make the decisions necessary
to fully utilize these instruments.  Since market-based instruments have been used on a limited basis only,
and firms are not certain that these instruments will be a lasting component on the regulatory landscape,
most companies have not reorganized their internal structure to fully exploit the cost savings these
instruments offer.  Rather, most firms continue to have organizations that are experienced in minimizing the
costs of complying with command-and-control regulations, not in making the strategic decisions allowed
by market-based instruments (Hockenstein, Stavins, and Whitehead 1997).
The focus of environmental, health, and safety departments in private firms has been primarily on
problem avoidance and risk management, rather than on the creation of opportunities made possible by
market-based instruments.  This focus has developed because of the strict rules companies have faced
under command-and-control regulation. In response to these strict  rules companies have built skills and
developed processes that comply with regulations, but do not help them benefit competitively from
environmental decisions (Reinhardt 2000).  Absent significant changes in structure and personnel, the full
potential of market-based instruments will not be realized.  Economic models may thereby underestimate
the relative costs of employing such instruments to achieve global climate targets.
Finally, the costs of achieving any given global climate target, indeed the very feasibility of achieving
such targets, will depend upon the nature of respective international agreements and the institutions that exist
to support those agreements.  This is also an area where economic analysis (along with political science and
legal scholarship) can contribute.  A principal issue is the architecture of such agreements and the breadth
of the coalitions that are parties to them (Jacoby, Prinn, and Schmalensee 1998; Schelling 1998).  From
an economic perspective, a fundamental challenge is the necessity of overcoming the strong incentives for
free riding that exist with a global commons problem (Carraro and Siniscalco 1993; Barrett 1994; Cooper20What rate should be used to carry out this discounting?  There is a an extensive literature in economics that addresses
this  question.  A comprehensive summary was provided by Lind (1982), and a more recent exploration was organized
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1998).  More specifically, there is a pressing need to design international policy instruments that can
provide incentives over time for more nations — in particular, developing countries — to join the coalition
and take on binding targets or other responsibilities (Manne and Richels 1995; Rose, Stevens, Edmonds,
and Wise 1998; Frankel 1999; Bohm and Carlén 2000).
1.3  How Can Benefit and Cost Information be Assimilated for Decision-Makers?
The next analytical challenge, after the benefits and costs of proposed global climate change policies
have been assessed, is to assimilate this information in ways that are useful for decision-makers.  Two major
categories of analysis are required:  one is to provide an overall characterization of a policy in terms of its
likely benefits and costs (aggregate analysis); and another is to describe the distribution of those benefits
and costs across relevant populations, defined, for example, by geographic location, economic sector,
income level, or time period (distributional analysis).
1.3.1  Aggregate Analysis
It seems reasonable to ask whether the gains (to the gainers) outweigh the losses (to the losers) of
some public policy, and thus determine, on net, whether society as a whole is made better or worse off as
a result of that policy.  Benefit-cost analysis is the standard technique used to carry out this comparison of
the favorable effects of risk reductions (the benefits) with the adverse consequences (the costs).  A policy
that achieves maximum aggregate net benefits is said to be an efficient one.  Although efficiency is surely
an important criterion for sound policy analysis, most economists think of benefit-cost analysis as no more
than a tool to assist in decision making.  Virtually all would agree, however, that the information in a
well-done benefit-cost analysis can be of great value in helping to make decisions about risk reduction
policies (Arrow et al. 1996).
Time is a critical and prominent dimension of global climate change policy.  First, greenhouse gases
accumulate in the atmosphere over very long periods (up to hundreds of years), because of their very slow
natural decay rates.  Second, changes in the capital stock that are made in response to the threat of climate
change have long lives:  for example, 50 to 70 years for electricity generators, and 60 to 100 years for
residential buildings (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 1999).  Third, exogenous and endogenous technological
change are long-term phenomena that have great bearing on global climate change and policies to address
it.  For all three reasons, benefit-cost analyses of global climate policies must involve the dimension of time,
and over very long intervals.
When adding the value of net benefits over time, it is essential to recognize that people are not
indifferent between receiving a given economic benefit (or paying a given economic cost) today or ten or
twenty years from now.  For this reason, all future net benefits are typically discounted (expressed in terms
equivalent to the time-value of today’s net benefits); that is, the present value of net benefits in each year
is computed before aggregating net benefits over time.20by Portney and Weyant (1999).
21The  time  dimension  is  also  crucial,  of  course,  in  one type of distributional analysis, namely intertemporal distribution,
as is discussed below.
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While the concept of discounting has a sound rationale, it can lead to conclusions that many people,
including economists, find unpalatable.  For long-run policy problems, such as global climate change, little
weight will be given in an analysis to the long-term benefits of taking action, compared with the up-front
costs of those actions.  This conundrum has stimulated an active area of research (Portney and Weyant
1999), as economists have considered how best to address the apparent dilemma.  One avenue of this
research has suggested a theoretical basis for employing lower discount rates for longer run analyses
(Weitzman 1999).  Considerations of time can thus have profound effects on aggregate analysis of the
benefits and costs of alternative climate policies.21
In addition to time, uncertainty is a prominent feature of global climate change, on both the benefit
and the cost side of the ledger.  In effect, the risks of premature or unnecessary actions need to be
compared with the risks of failing to take actions that subsequently prove to be warranted (Goulder 2000).
Because of this, many economic analyses have indicated that climate change may best be addressed
through sequential decision making, with policies being modified over time as new information becomes
available and uncertainties are reduced.  Because such new information is potentially of great value, flexible
policies that adapt to new information have very significant advantages over more rigid policy mechanisms.
The significant uncertainties associated with global climate change interact with the intertemporal
nature of the problem to yield another important dimension — irreversibility (Kolstad and Toman 2000).
It is well known that in the presence of uncertainty, combined with long-lived  impacts (economic, if not
physical irreversibility), there is a value (called quasi-option value by economists) in delaying those impacts
until more information is available (Hanemann 1989).  This value should, in principle, be included in the
calculation of benefits and costs.  In the global climate  context, the irreversibilities include both the
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the accumulation of capital investments that cannot
easily be reversed.  These two effects push a stochastic benefit-cost analysis of global climate policy in
opposite directions.  Which is dominant?  Although it has been argued that the second effect is more
important (Kolstad 1996), it is ultimately an empirical question (Ulph and UIph 1997; Narain and Fisher
2000).
1.3.2  Distributional Analysis
This discussion of benefits and costs, as well as the way the two are compared, has glossed over
an important point, and one that is exceptionally important in the context of global climate change policy.
Specifically, benefit-cost analysis is silent about the distributional implications of policy measures.  Although
considerable thought has been given by economists over the years to the possibility of using weights to
incorporate distributional considerations into determinations of efficiency, there is no consensus, nor likely
to be one, on what those weights ought to be.  It seems reasonable, instead, to estimate benefits and costs,
and also provide as much information as possible to decision makers about gainers and losers.11
Assessments of national, intra-national, and intergenerational distributions of the benefits and costs
of alternative policy regimes are necessary for the identification of equitable climate strategies.  A number
of  criteria merit consideration (Goulder 2000).  First, the criterion of responsibility would suggest that —
other things equal — those nations that are most responsible for the accumulation of greenhouse gases in
the atmosphere should take on the greatest burden for containing the problem.  Second, the criterion of
ability to pay is premised on the notion that wealthier nations possess greater capacity to respond to the
problem. Third, the criterion of the distribution of benefits suggests that those nations which stand to
benefit most from action taken ought to take on greater shares of the cost burden.  The first two
considerations suggest that industrialized nations should bear the principal burdens for dealing with the
prospect of climate change, while the third consideration favors action by developing countries.
Because  of  the  long  time-horizon  of  global  climate  policy  analysis,  important  issues of
intergenerational equity arise.  But it should be noted that the use of discounting in benefit-cost analysis
has ambiguous effects.  For example, some have called for not discounting future costs and benefits at all
when time-horizons are very great.  At first, this might seem to be a course of action that would favor future
generations.  In an important sense, however, it does not.  If, by using a zero or very low discount rate, we
adopt policies that do not pay off until the distant future, we are favoring climate policy action over other
policies for which a standard (higher) discount rate is used.  As a result, we may pass up opportunities to
employ other, non-climate policies that could benefit future generations.  Thus, it is not clear that we make
future generations better off by using a low rate of discount.  More broadly, Schelling (1998) has highlighted
the trade-off that may exist between policies to address intergenerational equity and those that address
(current) distributional equity:  by taking actions to protect future generations (who presumably will be
better off than current ones), we reduce the resources available to help today’s poor in developing
countries.
1.4  The Path Ahead
Global climate change — perhaps even more than other environmental problems — can be
addressed successfully only with a solid understanding of its economic dimensions.  A substantial body of
economic literature can be brought to bear on the three broad questions that are raised by the threat of
global climate change:  what will be the benefits of global climate policies; what will be their costs; and how
can this information about alternative policies be assimilated in ways that are ultimately most useful for
decision makers?  Although the existing literature from decades of economic analysis is helpful in addressing
these questions, the truth is that global climate change policy — because of the magnitude of its anticipated
benefits and costs, its great time horizons,  massive uncertainties, and physical and economic irreversibilities
— presents unprecedented challenges to economic research, as it does to the other social and natural
sciences.
The five chapters that follow this one stake out a number of the frontiers of that research,
addressing in turn five particularly timely and important aspects of the overall puzzle.  First, in an “Overview
of Economic Models,” John Weyant provides a much-needed user’s guide to the large-scale integrated
assessment models that continue to be central to much of the research and many of the policy debates on
global climate change.  Weyant reviews the structure, data, and findings of fourteen of the most prominent12
large-scale economic models, and explains how the models differ, how they do not, and how their results
relate to one another.
One of the key determinants identified by Weyant — the role played in respective models by
technological change — becomes the sole focus of the second chapter, “Technological Change and Global
Climate Change Mitigation,” by Jae Edmonds, Joseph Roop, and Michael Scott.  These authors emphasize
that understanding the way technologies evolve and penetrate the market is essential to understanding
methods of addressing global climate change.  Their focus, then, is on the ways in which technological
change  is  captured  by  climate  change  policy  modelers,  with  particular  attention to two idealized
approaches:  top-down and bottom-up.  Their conclusion is consistent with Weyant’s, namely that in order
to understand the implications of large-scale economic models of the climate change problem, it is essential
to understand first the assumptions that have been made regarding the path of technological progress.
Much of the analysis of technological change in the global climate policy context has focused
directly on products and processes related to the generation and use of energy, because of the prominence
of fossil-fuel combustion and consequent CO2 emissions as a major contributor to the accumulation of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  The area of technological change which has been most dramatic over
the past decade, however, has surely been information technology.  What effects, if any, will the emergence
of the related “new economy” have on the costs of achieving global climate targets? 
This question is the topic of the third chapter in this part of the book, “The ‘New Economy’ and
Global Climate Change Policy,” by Everett Ehrlich and Anthony Brunello.  Drawing upon both economic
theory and empirical evidence, they first argue that as the marginal cost of processing information falls, there
will be substitution of information and information-related activities for energy in the production of goods
and services.  Second, they find that this will lead to more specialization and greater outsourcing of energy
service management.  Third, empirical analysis suggests that consequent changes in the capital stock will
mean that given policies intended to reduce CO2 emissions will have more benign effects on the economy
than otherwise.  Their overall conclusion is that the information revolution will cause the economic costs of
climate change policies to be less than previously thought.
If there is one lesson that has been learned from the 30 years of environmental policy experience
that began with the first Earth Day, it is that flexible environmental policies cost less than more rigid ones.
In  particular,  market-based  instruments,  such  as  taxes  and  tradeable  permit  systems,  can enable
governments to achieve their environmental targets at lower aggregate costs than via conventional,
command-and-control approaches.  Given the magnitude of the global climate change problem, the
potential for cost savings with such instruments is enormous, and this is documented in the fourth chapter,
“International Emissions Trading and Global Climate Change,” by Jae Edmonds, Michael Scott, Joseph
Roop, and Christopher MacCracken.
With some simple, but powerful numerical examples, and with a review of the results from eight
models of carbon trading, the authors are able to document the degree to which international greenhouse
gas emissions trading would lower overall mitigation costs.  They highlight the fact that the cost savings will
increase if greater flexibility is provided in trading mechanisms, such as by allowing trade among the major13
greenhouse gases, across types of sources, and over time.  But the authors also note that the full economic
potential of these trading regimes will be reached only if crucial issues of program design and institutional
structure are successfully addressed.
Finally, as I emphasized above, because climate policy compliance costs are initially incurred by
private firms, it is essential to analyze the behavioral response of such firms to various policy regimes.
Nearly all economic analyses treat firms as atomistic, profit-maximizing or cost-minimizing units, but firms
are vastly more complex.  Although such simplifying assumptions are satisfactory for many purposes, it is
useful to go inside the black box of the firm to understand private industry’s approach to the climate
problem and potential solutions.  This is precisely the purpose of the fifth and final chapter in this part of
the book, “A Business Manager’s Approach to Climate Change,” by Kimberly Packard and Forest
Reinhardt.  
The authors address a key question:  how can managers reconcile the goals of improving both
shareholder value and environmental performance?  This is a question that has generated considerable
debate in the past, but that debate has all too often been dominated by extreme and misleading views:  on
the one hand, by wishful thinkers who see “win-win opportunities” even where there are severe tradeoffs
between environmental and private financial goals; and, on the other hand, by idealogues who portray all
environmental regulations as crippling for business.  Packard and Reinhardt make sense of this confused
and confusing debate, and thus describe a more sensible path for business managers in the face of real
concerns about global climate change and the new policies that such concerns may bring forth.
Overall, the five chapters that follow provide instructive examples of how economics can offer
powerful analytical methods for investigating the problem of global climate change, and how economic
analysis can thereby provide valuable insights about potential solutions to this very challenging problem.14
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